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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The scope of liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 19341 (“Act”) is a hazy area of jurisprudence for 
those in academics and in the business world alike. Until recently, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver largely governed the area.2 Accountants, 
lawyers, underwriters, and others often faced liability under Section 
10(b), until the Supreme Court held in Central Bank that the 
Securities Act did not reach those who aided or abetted a Section 
10(b) violation.3 After Central Bank, liability attaches only to 
“primary participants” in investor defrauding schemes, though 
 
 * 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange--(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or 
any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act [15 USCS § 78c note]), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”). 
 2. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 3. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 760 (5th ed. 2006) (noting that aiding and abetting a 
client’s conduct was itself a violation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for three decades). 
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different definitions of this term have since emerged between the 
circuits.4 
Thirteen years after Central Bank, both the definition and the 
scope of liability for “primary participants” reached the Court for 
clarification. Yet, when the Supreme Court decided Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,1 it effectively 
declined either to resolve the circuit split regarding who qualifies as a 
primary participant or to narrow the scope of Section 10(b) liability. 
The Court, instead, simply held that the vendors who had aided a 
communications company in its fraudulent public statements could 
not be held liable because the investors did not rely upon the 
defendants’ statements or representations. Thus, although Stoneridge 
is still an unequivocally pro-business decision, the concept of scheme 
liability was not rejected outright, no doubt to the chagrin of many in 
the business world. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
the Court granted review of a Tenth Circuit decision allowing private 
aiding and abetting actions under Section 10(b).5 Plaintiff First 
Interstate purchased bonds issued by the local authority. Central 
Bank was the indenture trustee for the bonds and was thus 
contractually obligated to ensure compliance with the bonds’ 
covenants.6 After the appraisal for the bond offering was found to be 
dated, Central Bank delayed independent review of the appraisals 
and the local authority defaulted on the bonds prior to any review by 
Central Bank.7 
Noting that the express liability provisions of the Securities and 
Exchange Act do not proscribe aiding and abetting and that a private 
Section 10(b) claim is an implied cause of action, the Court 
determined that Congress could not have intended to proscribe such 
activity in a private Section 10(b) claim.8 Accordingly, “only the 
making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission 
 
 4. See id. at 764–70 (discussing the differing approaches taken by the varying circuits as 
well as the SEC’s position). 
 5. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 164. 
 6. Id. at 167. 
 7. Id. at 167–68. 
 8. See id. at 179–80. 
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of a manipulative act” is prohibited by the statute.9 Finally, the Court 
noted that allowing an action for aiding and abetting under Section 
10(b) would have circumvented the judicially-created reliance 
requirement because there was no showing that the plaintiff had 
relied on Central Bank’s statements or actions.10 
Subsequent to Central Bank, two different approaches emerged 
for determining whether a secondary actor can be held primarily 
liable under Section 10(b). The stricter approach, opposed by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), is referred to as the 
“bright-line” test and mandates that “a defendant must actually make 
a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under 
Section 10(b).”11 The Second Circuit reiterated this approach in 
Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, when it held that “the 
misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor [making 
the misrepresentation] at the time of public dissemination, that is, in 
advance of the investment decision.”12 
Most courts, however, use the “substantial participation” test, 
which focuses on the degree of involvement the defendant had in the 
making of the misleading statement. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that accountants and underwriters who both had a significant 
role in drafting, reviewing, and editing misleading financial reports 
and deliberately concealed the truth could be held liable as primary 
participants.13 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that “while an attorney 
representing the seller in a securities transaction may not always be 
under an independent duty to volunteer information about the 
financial condition of his client, he assumes a duty to provide 
complete and nonmisleading information with respect to subjects on 
which he undertakes to speak.”14 
In the wake of the Central Bank decision, Congress passed the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), Pub. L. 
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 743, which added Section 20(e) to the Exchange 
 
 9. Id. at 177 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)). 
 10. Id. at 180. 
 11. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re MTC Elec. Techs. 
S’holders Litig., 898 F. Supp 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 12. Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1104 (1999). 
 13. In re Software Toolworks Inc. v. Painewebber Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 627, 629 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
 14. Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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Act15 and affirmed the right of the SEC to prosecute aiders and 
abettors.16 Private actors were not extended this right, in accordance 
with the general themes of the PSLRA to curb abusive actions, 
frivolous suits, and huge settlements.17 
The Court could have reviewed the Eighth Circuit’s decision to 
resolve the circuits’ split regarding the proper test for finding a 
secondary actor liable under Section 10(b). But instead, the Court 
seemingly ignores much of this backdrop in its decision in Stoneridge, 
though it does mention the intentions of Congress with the PSLRA 
and the Act’s relevance for secondary actors.18 
III.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The plaintiffs in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., were stockholders of Charter Communications, Inc. 
(“Charter”) who had purchased Charter shares on the open market. 
This purchase led to the subsequent securities fraud class action 
against: Charter; ten Charter executives; Charter’s independent 
auditor, Arthur Andersen, LLP; and two equipment vendors, 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc. (collectively, the 
“Vendors”).19 
The plaintiffs alleged that Charter inflated its stock price by 
entering into sham transactions with the Vendors, which Charter used 
as the basis for misleading financial statements.20 Specifically, the 
Vendors’ arrangement with Charter “improperly inflated Charter’s 
reported operating revenues and cash flow.”21 According to the 
plaintiffs, the Vendors knew upon entering into these sham 
transactions that Charter would account for them improperly, leading 
 
 15. See 15 USCS § 78t(e) (“Prosecution of persons who aid and abet violations. For 
purposes of any action brought by the Commission under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 21(d) 
[15 USCS § 78u(d)(1) or (3)], any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to 
another person in violation of a provision of this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.], or of any rule or 
regulation issued under this title [15 USCS §§ 78a et seq.], shall be deemed to be in violation of 
such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.”). 
 16. Codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1995). 
 17. Thomas O. Gorman, Vendors May Face Higher Risk When Doing Business With Public 
Companies: ‘Stoneridge’ and Scheme Liability, CORP. COUNS. WKLY., Oct. 17, 2007, at 320. 
 18. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772–73. 
 19. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 20. In re Charter, 443 F.3d at 989. 
 21. Id. 
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analysts to recommend the stock based on the inflated revenues.22 
Importantly, the plaintiffs did not allege that the Vendors were 
involved in the preparation or dissemination of the fraudulent 
financial statements and press releases on which analysts and 
investors subsequently relied.23 
Based on Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver,24 the district court granted defendant-Vendors’ motion to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 10(b) 
claims and denied the plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration and for 
leave to amend their complaint.25 The court held that there was no 
basis for the plaintiffs’ “conclusion that business partners, such as [the 
Vendors], made false and misleading statements by virtue of engaging 
in a business enterprise with a company such as Charter, the entity 
purported to have made the statements at issue.”26 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs’ focus on 
Charter’s deception in publishing fraudulent financial reports and 
press releases failed to allege that either Motorola or Scientific-
Atlanta “engaged in any such deceptive act.”27 Thus, the claims against 
the Vendors had been properly dismissed “as nothing more than 
claims barred by Central Bank that the Vendors knowingly aided and 
abetted the Charter defendants in deceiving the investor plaintiffs.”28 
IV.  HOLDING 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., but did 
not adopt its reasoning. Instead, the Court held that because Charter 
investors did not rely on the Vendors’ statements or representations, 
the Section 10(b) private right of action does not reach the Vendors.29 
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s notion that Section 10b-530 
 
 22. Id. at 990. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 25. In re Charter, 443 F.3d at 989, 991. 
 26. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 1506, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29647, at *21 (E.D. Mo. 
Oct. 12, 2004). 
 27. In re Charter, 443 F.3d at 992. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 774 (2008). 
 30. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2000) (“Employment of manipulative and deceptive 
devices. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
DO NOT DELETE 2/12/2009 8:58:02 AM 
286 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:281 
 
required a “specific oral or written statement but did not extend to 
deceptive acts and practices.”31 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy specified that conduct, 
rather than just public misstatements, can be deceptive. Indeed, the 
Vendors’ conduct in the form of oral and written misstatements, 
including the backdated contracts that permitted Charter’s improper 
accounting, was deceptive and thus proscribed by Section 10(b).32 The 
Court softened its blow, however, by claiming that the holding in the 
lower court could also be interpreted as stating only that respondents’ 
conduct, though deceitful, was not actionable due to its lack of 
“requisite proximate relation to the investors’ harm.”33 This opened the 
door for the Court to examine the reliance issue on which it had 
apparently hoped to focus instead of the exact threshold for liability.34 
Since the Court’s decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 
(1988), the plaintiff’s reliance upon the defendant’s deceptive acts has 
been considered an “essential element of the Section 10(b) private 
cause of action.”35 The Court stated that “a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance” exists in either of two circumstances: (1) where one with a 
duty to disclose omits a material fact; 36 or (2) under the fraud on the 
market doctrine.37 Because here the Vendors had no duty to disclose 
information and because their acts were not communicated to the 
public, neither presumption applied. The Court found that the 
investors were unaware of the sham transactions of the Vendors that 
 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”). 
 31. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. Notably, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg commented at oral argument that 
the reliance issue was not squarely before the Court. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55–57, 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43). 
 35. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The fraud on the 
market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the 
price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the 
company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock 
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.”). 
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were then used to prepare the statements made to the public, so 
investors cannot impute reliance on these transactions to the 
Vendors.38 
In conclusion, the Court warned of the policy implications of 
extending the implied cause of action under Section 10(b) to the 
practices in question, which would “invite litigation beyond the 
immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already 
governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees.”39 
Additionally, were the Court to adopt the investors’ construction of 
Section 10(b), it would revive the cause of action against aiders and 
abettors authorized only to the SEC by the PSLRA.40 Finally, the 
Court noted that a decision to extend the private cause of action 
rested with Congress.41 
V.  ANALYSIS 
In the months prior to and following Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.’s oral arguments, many 
believed it to “be the most important securities law decision in 
years.”42 Others noted its potential to be the business “decision of the 
century.”43 Specifically, “[a] ruling by the Court adopting the position 
of either party would dramatically reshape Section 10(b) liability and 
could change the way business is conducted.”44 
A decision in favor of the plaintiffs and their open-ended scheme 
liability theory would have permitted the Enron Litigation,45 Simpson 
v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.,46 and future class actions to proceed, 
“potentially imposing securities fraud liability and damage awards on 
a host of companies, banks, investment banks, and other unsuspecting 
 
 38. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770. 
 39. Id. at 771. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 772–73. 
 42. Gorman, supra note 17, at 320. 
 43. Posting of Thomas O. Gorman to SEC Actions, http://www.secactions.com/?p=293 
(Jan. 16, 2008, 2:18PM EST). 
 44. Gorman, supra note 17, at 318. 
 45. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 
(5th Cir. 2007) (the “Enron Litigation”), cert denied., 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008). 
 46. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub 
nom. Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Calif. State Teachers’ Retirement System, 128 S. Ct. 1119 
(2008), and remanded. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/12/2009 8:58:02 AM 
288 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:281 
 
business partners of public companies.”47 Such an imposition was a 
common concern in the majority opinion,48 as it would have forced 
public companies and their securities lawyers to agonize over the 
minute details of every transaction prior to a closing. This agony 
would be in addition to the costliness of preventing liability through 
due diligence, in addition to the unfortunate possibility that foreign 
companies would refrain from doing business in the United States 
under such stringent legal standards.49 Finally, a decision extending 
liability to secondary actors would have directly conflicted with the 
Court’s continuing efforts to “circumscribe the implied cause of 
action,” consistent with its efforts under the PSLRA.”50 
Conversely, the Court’s actual decision can be viewed as contrary 
to the principles underlying the PSLRA, which are meant to provide a 
remedy for those who actually suffer a loss in the securities realm. For 
example, in many instances the secondary actors could be seen as 
providing the deepest pockets for an injured shareholder, given the 
primary actor’s financial distress. The Court, however, apparently 
believes that this problem can be addressed by the SEC because the 
Court’s decision reiterates the agency’s ability to bring fraud claims 
based on aiding and abetting liability.51 The beauty of deciding 
Stoneridge solely on the element of reliance is that the SEC is not 
inhibited because it does not have to prove reliance.52 
Although the decision can certainly be read as pro-business, 
Stoneridge is not the “decision of the century” as some had 
anticipated.53 The decision was a narrow holding that merely 
elaborated on the SEC’s ability to bring actions against secondary 
actors but that declined to narrow the scope of Section 10(b) liability. 
Had the Court upheld the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, class actions 
against issuers and others would have been demonstrably more 
difficult given the limited reach of the private right of action under 
Section 10(b). 
 
 47. Gorman, supra note 17, at 318. 
 48. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 771–73 (2008). 
 49. Id. at 772. 
 50. Gorman, supra note 17, at 319. 
 51. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772–73 (2008) (clarifying that the preclusion of a private 
claim does not preclude an SEC action). 
 52. Gorman, supra note 43. 
 53. Id. 
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A holding affirming the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and reasoning, 
however, would have been somewhat consistent with the Court’s most 
recent securities fraud decision, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., in which the Court interpreted the PSLRA to mandate pleading 
a strong inference of scienter.54 The Tellabs decision demonstrated the 
Court’s proclivity to interpret the implied cause of action under 
Section 10(b) narrowly, while the Court’s decision in Stoneridge does 
so in a somewhat less predictable manner. 
The dissent noted that, given the isolated nature of the 
transactions in question, perhaps a decision in favor of the plaintiffs 
would not inhibit business in the manner feared.55 Specifically, “[a] 
corporation engaging in a business transaction with a partner who 
transmits false information to the market is only liable where the 
corporation itself violates Section 10(b). Such a rule does not invade 
the province of ‘ordinary’ business transactions.”56 The dissent 
emphasized that when a party has so clearly violated a law designed 
to protect a group of people, the victims should have their remedy in 
court—even if the court must fashion the remedy via an implied cause 
of action.57 
The court implicitly reaffirmed its Stoneridge decision by denying 
certiorari in the Regents of the University. of California. v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (the Enron Litigation) and Avis 
Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’ Retirement System (the 
Simpson class actions) class actions mere days later.58 The disposition 
of these cases is instructive given each case’s similarities and 
differences from the fact pattern and decision-making in the lower 
courts compared to Stoneridge.59 
In the Enron Litigation, the Fifth Circuit held that the investment 
bank defendants, who allegedly structured sham transactions knowing 
Enron would use them in “misstating its accounts” and thus defraud 
 
 54. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). 
 55. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 779–82 (noting that the purpose of the Act is to protect investors from exactly 
the sort of deceptive conduct involved here). 
 58. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (mem), 128 
S. Ct. 1120 (2008) (denying certiorari); Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’ 
Retirement System (the Simpson class actions) (mem.), 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (denying 
certiorari). 
 59. Gorman, supra note 43. 
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its shareholders, did not violate Section 10(b).60 The court based its 
holding on the Supreme Court’s precedent in Central Bank that 
Section 10(b) “does not give rise to aiding and abetting liability.”61 
This holding is startlingly similar to the decision of the Eighth Circuit 
in Stoneridge; however, on the reliance issue, the Fifth Circuit reached 
a similar conclusion as the Supreme Court in Stoneridge—that the 
plaintiffs had not alleged that the defendants had made “public and 
material misrepresentations.”62 The Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari is significant because it leaves standing both a ruling on the 
deceptive act, narrower than that reached in Stoneridge, and a win for 
the defendants on the same reliance grounds as in Stoneridge.63 
In Simpson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the scheme liability 
alleged by the plaintiffs combined with a fraud on the market 
presumption was a sufficient Section 10(b) cause of action.64 Given 
the lower court’s careful examination of reliance and the fraud on the 
market theory, it is not surprising that the Court granted certiorari 
and then remanded the case.65 Additionally, the Supreme Court did 
not specifically reject the Ninth Circuit’s scheme liability because it 
disregarded that issue and instead focused on the reliance element. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Given the Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., decision and the succinct rulings that followed, 
secondary liability under Section 10(b) remains a hazy area of 
securities law. Because the Supreme Court did not specifically 
renounce the concept of scheme liability when it remanded the Enron 
Litigation, did not affirm it when it granted certiorari in Simpson, and 
alluded that participation in a scheme to defraud may well reach the 
threshold of deception in Stoneridge, plaintiffs may continue to bring 
claims under the theory. 
 
 60. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA) (the Enron 
Litigations), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 386 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 385–86. 
 63. Gorman, supra note 43. 
 64. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 65. See Gorman, supra note 43 (The Simpson class action was remanded for further 
consideration in light of Stoneridge). 
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Meanwhile, the circuit split regarding the bright-line and 
substantial participation tests is as pronounced as it was prior to the 
Court’s undertaking of Stoneridge. What remains, then, is the critical 
factor of whether a secondary actor’s deception is actually disclosed 
to investors sufficient for them to show reliance. Issuers, their lawyers, 
and their business partners should therefore be increasingly wary of 
certain transactions’ disclosures in their SEC filings and other public 
statements in order to avoid meeting the reliance requirements 
adopted in Stoneridge. 
